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11. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the summary dismissal of Appellant Mark Person's petition for 
post-conviction relief. Clerk's Record (CR) 89. 
B. Procedural Historv and Statement of Facts 
Mark Person entered a conditional guilty plea to second degree murder on August 20, 
2002. Following preparation of a presentence investigation report, Mr. Person was sentenced to 
a term of life with 20 years fixed. On direct appeal, the Court of Appeals held that portions of 
Mr. Person's statements to police detectives should have been suppressed pursuant to .Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Upon remand, Mr. Person entered a binding Rule 11 plea 
whereby it was stipulated that the presentence investigation would be waived and the sentence 
imposed would be 50 years with 15 fixed. That judgment was entered on September 12,2005. 
State v. Person, 145 Idaho 293,295, 178 P.3d 658,660 (Ct. App. 2007), rev. denied (2008), 
citing State v. Person, 140 Idaho 934, 104 P.3d 976 (Ct. App. 2004). 
After the second guilty plea and imposition of sentence, counsel filed a motion to correct 
a clerical mistake pursuant to ICR 32 and 36, seeking to have copies of the PSI returned from 
D O C  or redacted to exclude suppressed evidence. That motion was denied and a direct appeal 
talcen. Relief was denied by the Court of Appeals in State v. Person, 145 Idaho 293, 178 P.3d 
658. CR 7, State v. Person, supra. 
On February 27,2007, Mr. Person filed apro se petition for post-conviction relief 
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in the entrance of the Rule 11 plea resulting in an 
invalid plea. Mr. Person also alleged ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, who had 
advised him that his appeal from the denial of the ICR 32 and 36 motion tolled the running of the 
time limits for the filing of a post-conviction petition. CR 5. 
Counsel was appointed, as was a special prosecutor for the state. CR 27, 34. 
The state then filed an answer to the petition offering among other defenses that the 
petition was time barred. The state asserted that the unappealed conviction was entered on 
September 9,2005, that the one year time limit for filing a post-conviction petition thus began 
forty-two days later on October 21, 2005, and that therefore the petition filed in 2007 was 
untimely. CR 46. 
The state followed the answer with a motion for summary dismissal and a brief in support 
thereof. CR 48, 53. The state also aslced the Court to take judicial notice of the underlying 
criminal case. CR 50. 
A hearing was held on the motion for suininary dismissal. At the end of the hearing, the 
District Court suinmarily dismissed the petition because it was time barred. The Court 
specifically declined to address any of the issues raised in the petition or any ofthe other 
defenses offered by the state. Tr. 9120107 p. 12. 
This appeal timely followed. CR 89. 
111. ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the District Court commit fundamental error in dismissing the petition for post- 
conviction relief as time barred on the claim that counsel was ineffective in negotiating an 
unenforceable plea agreement when the claim was filed well within a year of when the 
ineffective assistance was and could have been reasoilably discovered? 
IV. ARGUMENT 
The Petition was not Time Barred as it was Filed Within One Year of the Tiine 
When the Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Was and Could Have 
Reasonably Been Discovered. 
Mr. Person's petition claims ineffective assistance of counsel in negotiating a plea 
agreement which could not be enforced because it required the District Court to do an act it had 
no power to do, specifically, to strike suppressed statements fiom the 2003 PSI. That claim 
could not have reasonably been discovered prior to attempts by counsel to enforce it, and the 
ultimate determination by the Court of Appeals, with the subsequei~t denial of review by the 
Supreme Court, that appellate relief was not available. Given Mr. Person's petition was filed 
within one year of the time he could have reasonably discovered the claim, his petition was not 
untimely and the District Court committed fundamental error in summarily dismissing the 
petition for violation of the statute of limitations. 
The question of whether Mr. Person's petition was timely filed is a question of law over 
which the appellate court exercises free review. Fox v. State, 129 Idaho 88 1, 883,934 P.2d 947, 
949 (Ct. App. 1997). In this case, the argument that the petition was not untimely because it was 
filed within a year of when the ineffective assistance of counsel was and could reasonably have 
been discovered was not raised before the District Court. Therefore. fundamental error is 
asserted. Fundamental error is an error which so profouildly distorts the process that it produces 
manifest injustice and deprives the accused of the fundamental right to due process. State v 
Anderson, 144 Idaho 743,748, 170 P.3d 886,891 (2007). The fundamental error doctrine 
applies in appeals from summary dismissal of post-conviction petitions. Gonzales v. State, 120 
Idaho 759,762,718 P.2d 1159, 1161 (Ct. App. 1991). 
I.C. 5 19-4902(a) provides that a petition for post-conviction review may be filed within 
one year of the time from the expiration of the time for appeal, or from tile detennination of an 
appeal, or from the determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later. 
However, the limitations period may be tolled when the petitioner has effectively been denied 
access to the courts. Sayas v. State, 139 Idaho 957,959, 88 P.3d 776,778 (Ct. App. 2003). For 
example, an equitable tolling of the statute of limitations has been found where the petitioner was 
incarcerated in an out-of-state facility on an in-state conviction without legal representation or 
access to Idaho legal materials, and where mental disease andlor psychotropic medication renders 
a petitioner incompetent and prevents petitioner from earlier pursuing challenges to the 
conviction. Sayas v. State, supra, citinglsaak v. State, 132 Idaho 369,370 n. 1,972 P.2d 1097, 
1098 n. 1 (Ct. App. 1999). 
Likewise, there is a reasonable discovery exception to the statute of limitations. Fox v. 
State, supra, is instructive. In Fox, the dispositive question was whether Fox's petition was 
timely filed. At the time of Fox's conviction, I.C. 5 19-4902 provided a five year statute of 
limitation. However, in 1993, the statute was amended to provide a one-year statute of 
limitation. The district court determined Fox had one year after the amendment of the statute to 
file and dismissed his petition because it was filed one year and six months after the amendment. 
The Court of Appeals agreed with the dismissal with the exception of Fox's claim 
relating to ineffective assistance of counsel in a Rule 35 proceeding. His petition was filed 
within one year of the expiration of the time for appeal of the Rule 35 motion and therefore was 
not untimely. This result demonstrates that there is a discovery exception to the one-year statute 
of limitations. The time for filing a post-conviction relative to claims arising from the Rule 35 
motion began to run oilly upon the expiration of the time to appeal the Rule 35 motion. In other 
words, the statute began to run on the Rule 35 claims only when they were or reasonably could 
have been discovered. See also, Lake v. State, 124 Idaho 259, 858 P.2d 798 (Ct. App. 1993), 
holding that an application for post-conviction relief claiming ineffective assistance of counsel in 
a probation revocation proceeding was timely even though filed more than five years after the 
conviction, where the application was filed within five years of the probation revocation 
proceeding. See also, Gonzalez v. Slate, 139 Idaho 384,386,79 P.3d 743, 745 (Ct. App. 2003) 
( " . . . any post-conviction action tiled within the limitations period connected to the probation 
revocation order, but beyond the lilnitations period measured from the appeal period for the 
judgment of conviction may address only issues that arose from the probation revocation 
proceeding.") 
Fox also recognized the reasonable discovery exception in its analysis of Fox's claim that 
his petition should not be held untimely because he was raising claims that were only first 
recognized in Browning v. Vernon, 44 F.3d 818 (9th Cir. 1995), which would have enlarged the 
statute of limitations period to one year after the Browning decision became final. The Court of 
Appeals rejected this argument. However, the Court did not reject it because there is no 
reasonable discovery exception to the statute of limitations, but rather because the claims Fox 
intended to raise had been recognized long before Browning, in State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382,582 
P.2d 728 (1978). See also, John v. State, 129 Idaho 304,923 P.2d 101 1 (Ct. App. 1996). Instead 
of rejecting a reasonable discovery exception, Fox and John treat such an exception as a given. 
In this case, Mr. Person makes the following claim in his petition: 
When Person agreed to enter his plea of guilty it was with the specific 
understanding that no PSI would be made part of the sentencing process. This 
was an important condition to Person, since the 2003 PSI contained statements 
which the appellate court had determined required suppression. And, the 
illclusio~l of those umedacled remarks would almost certainly impact his 
classification within the prison system and his chances for parole. Absent this 
condition, it is highly unlikely Person would have entered into the plea bargain 
Person's attorneys of record knew this condition was key to his entering into a 
Rule 11 plea agreement and have said so, in open court, at the oral argument 
hearing on the motion to correct a clerical error. 
Accordiilgly the conduct of Person's attorneys constitutes ineffective assistance of 
counsel for either allowing Persoil to plead to conditions other than what they had 
informed him were an intrinsic part of the bargain or their failure to recognize that 
such a condition was beyond the power of district court to grant. 
This claim of ineffective assistance of counsel could not have been reasonably discovered 
until Mr. Person found out that the 2003 PSI had not been redacted or taken out of his prison 
record and then discovered tlxough the failure of the motions and subsequeilt appeal to correct 
the problem that removal of the offending material in the PSI was not part of the plea bargain 
andlor not something within the power of the district court to effect. It was not clearly known 
that the 2003 PSI could not be redacted or taken out of his prison record by the District Court 
until the resolution of the appeal on this question. The appeal decision was not filed until 
October 3 1, 2007. Therefore, Mr. Person's petition for post-conviction relief, filed on March 1, 
2007, was not untimely. Compare, Evensiosky v. State, 136 Idaho 189, 191,30 P.3d 967,969 
(2001) (discovery exception would not apply to claim discovered "well before [the] time for 
filing expired.") 
The error in summarily dismissing the petition was a fundamental error because it 
produced a manifest injustice and denied Mark Person the fundamental right to due process. 
State v. Anderson, supra. In wrongly denying Mr. Person a forum to raise his claims of 
ineffective assistance, the District Court denied him the most basic element of due process, entry 
into the courtroom. Therefore, even though the argument raised here was not raised below, this 
Court should now correct the manifest injustice by reversing the order summarily dismissing the 
petition as time barred. 
The District Court committed fundamental error in not applying the reasonable discovery 
rule to Mr. Person's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. As his petition was not untimely 
under the reasonable discovery rule, the order of summary disluissal should now be reversed and 
the matter remanded for an evidentiary hearing. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Mr. Person's petition for post-conviction relief was not time barred as it was filed well 
within a year of the time he could have reasonably discovered the ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel in negotiating a plea agreement outside of the scope of the District Court's power of 
compliance. He therefore asks that this Court reverse the order summarily dismissing his petition 
as time barred and remand for an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the petition. 
slC- 
Respectfully submitted t h i s 3  day of July, 2008. 
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